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RESUMEN 
Consideremos una reforma de un impuesto lineal neutral en recaudación y 
desigualdad. ¿Es realmente neutral dicha reforma impositiva con respecto a la 
distribución de la renta? Tradicionalmente, ha existido un sesgo en favor de la 
desigualdad dejándose de lado otros aspectos distributivos. Este tipo de reformas 
implican un conjunto de transferencias compuestas, progresivas y regresivas, 
incluso cuando la desigualdad permanece constante. En este artículo se presenta la 
polarización como un instrumento útil para caracterizar el conjunto de las 
transferencias generado por este tipo de reformas. La conclusiones se ilustran con 
ejercicio de simulación para el caso español, donde la polarización se utiliza para 
discriminar entre dos posibles alternativas. 
 
 




Let us assume a revenue- and inequality-neutral flat tax reform shifting  from a 
graduated-rate tax. Is this reform really distributional neutral? Traditionally, there 
has been a bias toward the inequality analysis, forgetting other relevant aspects of 
the income distribution. This kind of reforms implies a set of composite transfers, 
both progressive and regressive,  even though inequality remains unchanged. This 
paper shows that polarization is a useful tool for characterizing this set of transfers 
caused by inequality-neutral tax reforms. A simulation exercise illustrates how 
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* This paper has benefited from the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Technology #SEC2003-08397, and from Fundación BBVA.  1. Introduction 
 
Recent tax system reforms in Western economies provide evidence of an international 
trend towards the flattening of income tax structures (see Table 1). Efficiency gains are 
considered the main motivation for moving from a progressive tax system with graduated tax 
rates to one with a personal allowance and a single marginal tax rate (see Cassou and Lansing, 
2003). However, the redistributive pattern of linear tax reforms is complex and some careful 
analysis is required. In fact, it can be regarded as an application of a set of composite transfers, 
both progressive and regressive at the lower and higher ends of the initial distribution, 
respectively. Hence, a flat tax reform certainly benefits both the highest and the lowest ends of 
the income distribution, at the expense of  middle range incomes (see, for instance, Davies and 
Hoy, 2002). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The general setting is a revenue- and inequality-neutral flat tax reform shifting from a 
graduated-rate tax. The aim of this paper is to show that polarization is a useful tool for 
characterizing this set of transfers derived from this inequality-neutral tax reforms. As a 
consequence, polarization can be used to discriminate between two inequality-neutral tax 
alternatives. 
 
There are two main aspects dealt with throughout the paper. Firstly, there has 
traditionally been a bias toward the analysis of the inequality component of the income  2
distribution
1. However, there are some other relevant aspects (such as polarization, poverty, ...) 
which have been almost unconsidered. In fact, no relationship has yet been established between 
polarization and tax reforms (up to our knowledge). Whereas inequality relates to the overall 
dispersion of the distribution, polarization concentrates on the income distribution in several 
focal or polar modes.
2 One particular type of polarization we are going to contemplate is the 
bipolarization measure, which considers only two poles. In this context, bipolarization 
measurement can be used, for instance, as an indicator of an eventual reduction of the middle 
class. 
 
Secondly, a flat tax reform of the kind described above implies a set of composite 
transfers, both progressive and regressive, at the lower and higher ends, respectively, even 
though inequality remains unchanged. In this paper, we show that revenue- and inequality-
neutral flat tax reforms are not completely neutral since other properties of the income 
distribution are altered. We exploit this fact and characterize this set of transfers in terms of 
polarization. This is a relevant issue: since linear tax reforms benefit both the poor and the rich, 
at the expense of the middle class, bipolarization measurement can be seen and understood as a 
useful tool for characterizing the set of transfers caused by this kind of tax reforms. In addition, 
polarization will complement inequality analysis.  
 
Beyond the aim of this paper, the feasibility of these kinds of reforms can be justified, on 
political grounds, on the basis of the median voter model (see for example, Romer, 1975). 
                                                 
1 A huge literature has emerged due to this interest on inequality. See, for instance, Davies and Hoy (1995), 
Salas (1998), Ebert and Moyes (2000).  3
However, we consider that, given inequality, polarization measurements can be use to judge tax 
reforms. Both criteria, although based on different principles, are not fully independent, since -as 
we are going to show- polarization changes depend on the transfers in the middle range of the 
income distribution, that determine the size of the middle class.
3  
 
In this paper we analyze the effects of inequality- and revenue-neutral (non-necessarily 
linear) tax reforms. In Section 2, we present inequality and polarization as different concepts. In 
Section 3, relevant scenarios of polarization changes are described in order to characterize the 
possible net transfers of a tax reform. Section 4 illustrates the effects for the case of a flat tax 
reform and explores its relationship with net transfers occurring between the two polar groups. 
Finally, in section 5, fiscal policy simulations are carried out to illustrate the theoretical results of 
the paper on bipolarization by replacing the Spanish tax system with an equivalent linear tax. We 
make use of the European Countries Household Panel (ECHP) data set to develop the fiscal 
reform simulations.  
 
 
2. Polarization versus Inequality 
 
As a concept, polarization differs from the formal definition of inequality found in the 
literature. According to Wolfson (1994), a more bipolarized income distribution is one that is 
more spread out from the middle, so there are fewer individuals or families with middle level 
                                                                                                                                                               
2 Many papers agree on the conceptual difference between polarization and inequality; see for instance, 
Wolfson (1994, 1997), Esteban and Ray (1994), Esteban, Gradín, and Ray (1999) and Rodríguez and Salas (2003).  4
incomes. In addition, there is a sense that this spreading out is also associated with a tendency 
towards bimodality, a clumping of formerly middle level incomes at either higher or lower 
levels.  
 
Following Rodríguez and Salas's (2003) approach, the Wolfson bipolarization index can 
be obtained by subtracting the within-groups from the between-groups Gini coefficients, 
computed for groups separated by the median value: 
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where m is the median, µ  is the mean, F is the distribution function, G
B is the between-
groups Gini coefficient and G
W is the within-groups Gini coefficient, computed for groups 
separated by the median value. Notice that the subgroup income ranges do not overlap, and 
therefore there is an exact decomposition of the Gini coefficient into between-groups and within-
groups contributions. The conceptual advantage of this approach is that inequality and 
polarization can be viewed within the same framework, with addition and subtraction of the 
within-groups component corresponding to inequality and polarization, respectively.
4  
 
Furthermore, Rodríguez and Salas (2003) propose the extended Wolfson bipolarization 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 Hence, polarization changes and the median voter model results are somehow related. This issue is the 
subject of an ongoing research project. 
4 This is a well-known result, see, for instance, Wolfson (1994, 1997) and Esteban and Ray (1994), that 
polarization is not consistent with the principle of transfers, the basic assumption in inequality measurement. 
Nonetheless, polarization is consistent with the principle of transfers between polar groups. This fact can be 
appreciated easily in expression (1).  5
measure: 
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in which the bipolarization measure depends on a sensitivity parameter v associated with the 





3. Theoretical scenarios for the bipolarization impact of a tax reform 
 
Under a revenue- and inequality-neutral tax reform, even if behavior is altered, 
polarization can increase, decrease or remain constant.
7 We can identify three relevant scenarios 
under certain conditions. We are going to show that polarization parallels the between-groups 
inequality component under a revenue- and inequality-neutral tax reform, whenever the mean-




Under a G(F;v)-neutral tax reform, 
 
                                                 
5 Note that the proposed extension by Rodriguez and Salas (2003) actually was P(F;v) = G
B(F;v) – G
W(F;v) 
in a context of  median-preserving transfers. Otherwise, in a wider context, we should multiply it by the ratio 2µ /m. 
6 In Rodriguez and Salas (2003) is proved that given a particular income distribution X, the extended 
Wolfson bi-polarization measure, P(F;v), is consistent with the second polarization curve if v∈  [2, 3]. The second 
polarization curve plays a similar role in the context of bipolarization to that played by the Lorenz curve in the 
context of inequality (see Foster and Wolfson, 1992). A bipolarization index is consistent with the second 
polarization curve if a progressive median-preserving transfer within (between) polar subgroups never reduces 
(increases) polarization.  6
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,  the fact that 
under an inequality-neutral tax reform, dG(F;v)=0, and taking into account that G(F;v) = G
B(F;v) 
+ G




This means that Sign(dP(F;v)) = Sign(dG
B(F;v)) for a sufficiently low  () m d / µ , under an 
inequality-neutral tax reform. 
 
It is not likely that the ratio µ /m changes significantly enough when a revenue- and 
inequality-neutral tax reform is adopted, (see empirical evidence in the exercise below and in the 
Appendix).
  For a finite sample size, every two-parameters distribution function is fully 
characterized by the mean and a dispersion value. If the inequality measure we are controlling 
for is close to the dispersion measurement that characterizes the distribution, the ratio µ /m 
change will be low enough. In what follows, we assume that µ /m is not high enough. 
 
Scenario 1: Polarization increases. The polarization measure increases when G
B(F;v) goes up, 
G
W(F;v) goes down, or both indices increase and decrease at the same time. However, when the 
extended Gini coefficient is unchanged, only the last option is possible. Thus, the extended 
between-groups Gini index increases and the extended within-groups Gini coefficient decreases 
in this scenario. There exists a sufficiently low d(µ /m) such that: 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 Note that, although we follow the standard revenue-constant approach, the main results in this section  7
 
dP(F;v) > 0 ⇔  dG
B(F;v) > 0. 
 
Scenario 2: Polarization decreases. Through similar reasoning, the extended between-groups 
Gini index decreases and the extended within-groups Gini coefficient increases in this scenario. 
There exists a sufficiently low d(µ /m) such that: 
 
dP(F;v) < 0 ⇔  dG
B(F;v) < 0. 
 
Scenario 3: Polarization remains unchanged. Finally, we have the case where the ratio µ /m does 
not change. Not only do the revenue and inequality measurements remain unchanged but also the 
polarization measure remains unchanged:  
 
dP(F;v) = 0 ⇔  dG
B(F;v) = 0. 
 
In this case, G
W(F;v) has to remain constant as well. 
 
 
4. A theoretical flat tax exercise 
 
We can illustrate the intuition and implications of the results in Section 3 by means of a 
flat tax exercise. To establish the links between the scenarios and the net transfers, we use a 
revenue- and inequality-neutral exercise, where behavior is unaltered by this tax reform, which 
                                                                                                                                                               
apply to the more general case where revenue is not constant.  8
satisfies the condition of Proposition 1. In particular, we assume a system that changes from a 
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where t is the marginal tax rate and m is the personal allowance or the minimum threshold below 
which tax liability is zero. 
 
Given any inequality index that satisfies continuity and S-convexity (symmetry and the 
principle of transfers), Davies and Hoy (2002) show that the substitution of the existing 
graduated tax rate for the proposed flat tax, with revenue and inequality neutrality, guarantees a 
single crossing of the Lorenz curves associated with the post-tax income distributions. In turn, 
this generates a unique solution (t*, m*) for any S-convex inequality index. 
 
The extended Gini coefficient G(v) that we use in the empirical exercise is consistent, 
under a single Lorenz intersection, with the v+1
th-order inverse stochastic dominance (Zoli, 2000 
and Aaberge, 2000). The inverse stochastic dominance was defined by Muliere and Scarsini 
(1989) as similar to the classical direct dominance, except that successive accumulation is carried 
out with respect to ordered individuals instead of income.  For this reason, this dominance 
criterion is connected with the principle of positional transfer sensitivity (Zoli 1999) and the 




We establish the following proposition to set the connections between the 
scenarios in Section 2 and the net transfers. 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
 
Under a tax reform, 
 
Sign(dG
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where q is the corresponding quantile and LB(q) is the between-groups Lorenz curve (see 
Rodríguez and Salas, 2003).
9 In this case with two groups, separated by the median value, we 
can rewrite the above expression as if there were only two households as: 
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then Sign(dG
B(F;v)) = Sign(-dL(0.5)). 
 
                                                 
8 We could also apply the well-known result on third-order direct stochastic dominance (Shorrocks and 
Foster, 1987, Dardanoni and Lambert, 1988 and Davies and Hoy, 1994, 1995). In this case, the rule of thumb is the 
variance coefficient. This dominance criterion is connected with the principles of diminishing transfer (Kolm, 1976) 
or transfer sensitivity (Shorrocks and Foster, 1987) and it is consistent with all the expected utility welfare 
evaluation functions that satisfies monotonicity, concavity and non-decreasing third derivative.   10
This proposition is very general and does not only apply under revenue- and inequality 
neutral policies. This proposition is important because it helps to link polarization change with 
the net transfers occurring between the two polar groups through the changes in the G
B and 
L(0.5). Note that the sign of dL(0.5) determines the sign of the net transfers, in the sense that an 
increase/decrease/constant  L(0.5) determines the net transfers to be progressive/ 
regressive/neutral, as the relative mean income of the poorest group increases/decreases/remains 
constant. We apply this result to the scenarios under the conditions of Proposition 1. 
 
The whole population is separated into two groups by the median value, and a piecewise 
progressive income tax structure (TP line in Figure 1) is substituted by a linear tax system (TL 
line). Figure 1 represents the first scenario when polarization increases. There is a regressive net 
transfer as the relative mean income of the poorest group decreases. The middle class is reduced 
as income distribution is more spread out from the middle (or polarized). Moreover, the 
progressive transfer within the poorest income group overcomes the regressive transfer within 
the richest income group, leading to a reduction in the overall within-groups inequality. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Figure 2 (scenario 2) there is a progressive net transfer as the relative mean income of 
the poorest group increases. In this case, the middle class increases. Moreover, the regressive 
transfer within the richest income group overcomes the progressive transfer within the poorest 
income group to lead an increase in the overall within-groups inequality.  
                                                                                                                                                               
9 We define the between-groups Lorenz curve as the one corresponding to a distribution where the  11
 
[FIGURE  2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, in the third scenario there cannot be net transfers between both groups since the 
extended between-groups Gini coefficient, G
B(F;v), has to remain constant. In this case, there are 
no net transfers between groups because the mean income value of each group does not change. 
On the other hand, a linear tax reform benefits both the poor and the rich, at the expense of the 
middle class, as can be observed in Figure 3. This means that two sorts of income transfers 
within the groups are occurring at the same time: a progressive income transfer within the 
poorest group and a regressive income transfer within the richest group. Moreover, in order to 
obtain an unchanged extended within-groups Gini coefficient, G
W(F;v), the progressive and the 
regressive transfers have to exactly compensate to each other (null net transfers). 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Therefore, the analysis of a revenue- and inequality-neutral tax reform on its effects on 
polarization allow us to characterize, in a very simple way, the different sort of net transfers that 





                                                                                                                                                               
subgroup mean income value is allocated to every household in that subgroup.  12
5. A flat tax simulation exercise 
 
In this section we carry out two simulation exercises in order to evaluate the empirical 
effects on polarization of replacing the Spanish tax system with a revenue- and inequality-
equivalent flat tax in equation (2). This exercise illustrates the utility of scenarios under 
Propositions 1 and 2 for policy-makers to evaluate the impact of eventual tax reforms on 
polarization. 
 
We use micro-data drawn from the ECHP panel database for 1997. The sample comprises 
13,705 individuals. The equivalent income Y
e is computed using the Buhmann et al. (1988) and 








where N is the household size and α  is the equivalent scale parameter in the household. All 
observations are weighted according to the number of persons in the household. In this 
illustration we do not consider the statistical inference problems dealt with in Davidson and 
Duclos (2000). We also ignore the measurement errors due to contaminated data dealt with in 
Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996).  
 
The effects on polarization change resulting from this flat tax reform are unknown even 
in this simple exercise. Two different simulations are carried out with different impacts on 
polarization change, each of them corresponds to Scenarios 1 and 2 of the theoretical sections 2  13
and 3. Therefore, we can link these results with the set of the net transfers involved in either 
case.  
 
On top of that, one important aspect related to such a reform arises. The design of the 
threshold matters. In the baseline simulation exercise, a constant individual nominal threshold 
(CINT) is imposed. For example, if we establish CINT=1,000 euros, the household allowance 
will then be m=1,000N.  
 
The alternative exercise assumes a constant individual equivalent threshold (CIET). The 
individual equivalent threshold is constant for all individuals, in equivalent-income terms, 
regardless of the household size. If we set CIET=1,000 euros, the household allowance will be 
m=1,000N
α  euros. This is an interesting exercise, as it does not incorporate any source of 
horizontal inequity due to the threshold. 
 
Results under the baseline simulation are presented in Table 2, where marginal tax rates 
and income thresholds (t*, m*) are shown for different equivalent scales and different extended 
Gini inequality aversion parameters.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It can be observed that in the baseline linear tax reform bipolarization increases (except 
from α  = 0.75 and v ≥  2). Therefore, this simulation agrees with Scenario 1, where between-
groups inequality is increased and within-groups inequality is reduced (see Figure 1). Note that  14
the change in the component between/within-groups is the main factor explaining the change in 
polarization (see Table 4A in the Appendix). 
 
However, polarization change is different under the alternative simulation. Indeed 
polarization decreases as can be seen in Table 3 (except from α  = 0.5 and v = 1.5).  Therefore, 
Scenario 2 is the relevant one. From the theoretical framework there must be a progressive 
transfer from upper-middle to lower-middle class. Again the change in the component 
between/within-groups is the main factor explaining the change in polarization (see Table 4B in 
the Appendix). 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  Furthermore, in Figure 4, we present the relative income gains by centiles derived from 
the reform under consideration for v=2 and α =0.5.
10 In the baseline simulation, it is observed that 
losses are concentrated on two polar nodes of the income distribution, corresponding to the 
lower-middle and to the upper-middle classes. Winners are concentrated in both extremes of the 
income distribution. Therefore polarization is increased. The alternative simulation confirms the 
net progressive transfer from the upper-middle and to the lower-middle class, as there are also 
winners in the lower-middle range of the distribution.  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
10 A polynomial smoothing is applied in Figure 4 to clarify main trends.  15
Thus, real-data results confirm the theoretical result regarding the net transfers within the 
middle-class income levels highlighted in Section 4 and summarized by the idea underlying 
Figures 1 and 2. As a conclusion of this section, it can be said that the simulated flat tax reform 
generates two different outcomes, associated with an increase or a reduction, respectively, of the 
middle class consistent with our theoretical results, depending on whether there is a regressive or 




6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper evaluates the distributional effects of inequality- and revenue-neutral flat tax 
reforms shifting from a graduated-rate tax system. If polarization is borne in mind, we will be 
able to identify the composite set of transfers that will take place along the whole range of the 
income distribution. Polarization becomes an important feature of the income distribution and 
the analysis of its changes is an important question, specially in the case that inequality remains 
constant. 
 
The net transfers caused by a flat tax reform are characterized. Using the extended 
Wolfson bipolarization measure, relevant theoretical polarization scenarios are identified. Under 
certain conditions, an important result is that bipolarization changes along with between-groups 
inequality: bipolarization goes up or down if and only if between-groups inequality goes up or 
down. These conditions are satisfied in empirical terms. 
  16
The change from a graduated marginal tax rate to a flat tax benefits both the highest and 
the lowest ends of the income distribution, at the expense of middle range incomes (see for 
example, Davis and Hoy, 2002). However, we show how a flat tax reform may, in a 
counterintuitive way, decrease polarization. The reform may contribute to narrow the distance 
between the two polar groups separated by the median value, and therefore, to increase the size 
of the middle class. 
 
We have carried out two simulations that had opposite results on polarization. 
Nevertheless, both cases match very well with our theoretical framework. Hence, the proposed 
theoretical scenarios can be used to anticipate the distributive effects of a tax reform with 
minimum information requirements. This illustrates how important the polarization measurement 
can be in discriminating between two alternative inequality-neutral linear tax reforms. In the 
same way, these results can be extended to many other examples such as public utility pricing 
reforms or more general inequality-neutral public policy reforms. 
 
A by-product result of the specific linear tax reform under consideration is that the design 
of the thresholds matters, from the distributive point of view, even if we consider an inequality-
neutral tax reform. 
 
A future line of research may be the study of the feasibility of these tax reforms, on 
political grounds, in terms of the median voter model. This issue is directly related with the size 
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Table 1: Maximum and Minimum Marginal Tax Rates in the OECD 
 
MAXIMUM  TAX  RATE  MINIMUM  TAX  RATE 
















































































































































































OECD  Average  63 51 48 15 18 17 
EU  Average 65 54 51 18 20 17 
Source: Álvarez, Alonso, Gago y González (2001) 
(1)  The maximum marginal tax rate does not take into consideration territorial direct taxes in 1980. 
(2)  The minimum marginal tax rate does not take into consideration territorial direct taxes in 1980.  
(3)  The data of Iceland is for 1997 instead of 1999.  
  20
Table 2: Linear tax simulation under constant revenue and vertical redistribution 



















































































Source: ECHP database 1997. Sample size (N): 5427 households (13705 individuals). 
 
 
Table 3: Alternative linear tax simulation 

























































Source: ECHP database 1997. Sample size (N): 5427 households (13705 individuals).  21





















































































































Table 4A: Polarization change by components 
Baseline simulation   
Polarization 
change (%) 




Change in    
µ /m (%) 

























































Table 4B: Polarization change by components 
Alternative simulation   
Polarization 
change (%) 




Change in    
µ /m (%) 



















































Source: ECHP database 1997. Sample size (N): 5427 households (13705 individuals). 
 
 
 